The Situation
Daesh-influenced local terrorist groups like the Abu Sayyaf Group continue to operate in Central, Western, and Southern Mindanao. COVID-19 gave these groups new propaganda angles: highlighting government inadequacies and propagating extremist ideology through social media. Filipino social media had become a culture war where sophisticated audiovisual propaganda and memes had overtaken mainstream media in capturing public trust.
The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) and the Philippine government needed a coordinated response. Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism (PCVE) involves every branch of government: defense, justice, education, and local government units. But these sectors had no unified communications strategy. Each operated in its own silo. The 2020 Anti-Terror Law provided the legal framework, but without a coordinated communications plan, the government’s counter-narrative was fragmented while extremist messaging was not.
The Approach
Phase 1: National Action Plan Development
Created the National Action Plan (NAP) as a roadmap for inter-agency collaboration on PCVE communications. The NAP outlined planned interventions assigned per government sector with specific, time-bound, and measurable targets. It gave every stakeholder, from national defense agencies to local barangay officials, a clear role in the coordinated counter-narrative.
Phase 2: Multi-Sector Communications Training
Trained stakeholders across all sectors in both proactive communications (community engagement protocols and procedures) and reactive communications (issues management and crisis communications). The training ensured that government officials at every level could implement the NAP consistently, whether responding to an active incident or running a community-level prevention program.
Phase 3: Local Audience Cascading Strategy
Developed a strategic communications approach for cascading the NAP to local audiences with direct stakes in PCVE: vulnerable communities, persons deprived of liberty, civil society groups, religious leaders, learning institutions, and social media users. Each group required different messaging and different channels to reach the root of radicalization from multiple touchpoints.
Phase 4: Four-Year NAP Update & Current Events Integration
Updated the NAP four years after its initial creation to account for changes in national and local PCVE efforts, new events, and technological innovations that had affected the threat landscape. The update ensured the framework remained operational and responsive rather than becoming a static document.
The Results
- National Action Plan Adopted as the Philippines’ unified PCVE communications framework
- Multi-sector Training delivered across defense, justice, education, and local government
- 4-year update NAP revised and modernized to address evolving threat landscape
Campaign Highlights:
- NAP structured as a specific, time-bound, and measurable roadmap with assigned interventions per sector
- Training covered both proactive community engagement and reactive crisis communications
- Cascading strategy reached vulnerable communities, religious leaders, learning institutions, and social media users
- Framework addressed how extremist groups exploit social media for propaganda and recruitment
- Updated NAP incorporated four years of changes in the national and local PCVE landscape
The Takeaway
A counter-terrorism strategy without a communications plan is a law without a voice. UNCCT and the Philippine government had the policy framework. What they needed was a coordinated message that could reach every sector of government and every vulnerable community at the same time. The NAP gave that fragmented response a single direction.
- Industry: Public Sector
- Service: Strategic Planning
- Solution: For Enterprise
Frequently Asked Questions
How does a communications strategy contribute to counter-terrorism?
Terrorist groups succeed partly because their messaging is coordinated and the government’s response is fragmented. A unified communications framework gives every government sector the same narrative, the same protocols, and the same training. When the counter-narrative moves as one, it competes more effectively with extremist propaganda that has been operating as a single voice.
Why does counter-terrorism communications need to reach local audiences directly?
Because radicalization happens at the community level. National policy frameworks alone don’t reach vulnerable communities, persons deprived of liberty, or religious leaders who interact with at-risk individuals daily. The cascading strategy ensured the NAP’s messaging reached the specific people who encounter radicalization in their own communities.
Why update the NAP after four years?
Because the threat landscape evolves. COVID-19 gave extremist groups new propaganda angles. Social media platforms changed their algorithms and reach dynamics. New technologies emerged. A static plan from four years ago would address the threats of four years ago. The update ensured the framework remained operational against current realities.
What role does a PR agency play in a government counter-terrorism initiative?
Communications strategy development, stakeholder training, and message cascading. The government has the policy authority and the security apparatus. The communications agency provides the strategic framework that makes the message coherent and consistent across every sector, level, and audience that the government needs to reach.
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